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1. INTRODUCTION
The Employee Retirement Security Act (ERISA)1 seeks to ensure
that participants in pension plans can rely on the "timely and
uninterrupted payment of pension benefits."2 However, the trend of
insolvency within the insurance industry' combined with the Pension
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982)) [hereinafter ERISA]. See
infra Section II A.
2 ERISA, § 4002(a)(2). Pension Annuity Protection in Light of the Executive Life
Insurance Company Failure: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Retirement Income and
Employment of the House Select Comm. on Aging, Pt.L 102nd Cong., 2d Sess. 64 (1991)
[hereinafter Pension Annuity Protection, Pt. I] (testimony of Norman Stein, Prof. of Law.
Univ. of Alabama).
3 "Between January 1975 and December 1990, 170 life insurance companies failed
30-40 percent during 1989 and 1990." Certain Issues Related to the Conservatorship of the
Executive Life Insurance Company: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue
Measures of the House Comm. on Ways and Means. 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. 82 (1991)
[hereinafter Certain Issues Related to the Conservatorship) (testimony of Joseph Delfico,
Director. Income Security Issues, Human Resources Division). Not only has the number of
insolvencies per year increased (from an average of four insolvencies per year between 1969
to 1983, to over twenty per year), but large companies are now involved. Insurance
Company Solvency: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation. 102nd Cong.. 1st Sess. 1 (1991) [hereinafter Insurance Company Solvency]
ERISA
Benefit Guaranty Corporation's (PBGC's) position that it does not
insure participants' benefits once insurance products are purchased
to satisfy a plan's obligation,' challenge ERISA's ability to achieve
its goal.
The states are charged with regulation of the insurance industry
by the McCarran-Ferguson Act.5 Therefore, given the PBGC's
refusal to protect annuitants, retirees must rely on varying state
insolvency laws, which provide for payment through state guaranty
funds.6 The state protection of pensioners varies; if a company must
be liquidated, coverage depends on where annuitants live, where the
company is headquartered, and whether the company is licensed to
do business in its state of residence.7 Additionally, policy holders
may have to wait for payment from state guaranty funds because the
guaranty associations assess other insurers in the state to create the
fund after the decision has been made to liquidate the insolvent
insurer.8 Many of these state laws cover a smaller portion of
(statement of Senator Richard Byron).
Measured in terms of the total assets of failed life and health companies only as a
percentage of total industry assets, the failure rate through June 1991 was 15 times greater
than it was in 1989 and 220 times greater than in 1981. Hearing on Insurance Solvency:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer Protection, and Competitiveness
of the House Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 102nd Cong.. 1st Sess. 1 (1991) [hereinafter
Hearing on Insurance Solvency] (testimony of Martin Weiss, President, Weiss Research,
Inc.).
See infra Section I.
4 See letter of Carol Rowe, General Counsel for PBGC, to Donald Snyder,
Assistant Director of Pension Equality Issues, Human Resources Division, United States
General Accounting Office. Pension Annuity Protection, Pt. I, supra note 2, at 163. See
infra Section IV A. (There is support in the law for both the position that the guaranty
extends to insurance products and that it does not.).
15 U.S.C. § 1011-1015 (1982). See infra note 86 and accompanying text.
Pension Annuity Protection, Pt. I, supra note 2. at 61 (testimony of Joseph
Delfico, Dir., Income Security Issues, Human Resources Div.). See infra Section 13 D.
S Id. at 65.
8 Hearing on Ldfe Insurance Guarantee Funds: Before the Subcomm. on Commerce,
Consumer Protection, and Competitiveness of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce.
102nd Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1991) [hereinafter Hearing on Life Insurance Guarantee Fundsl
(statement of Marcia Horton for the American Council of Life Insurers). A guaranty
association's assessment of insurers in the state is subject to an annual limit ranging from
between 1% - 4% of the premiums for the type of policy being covered. Id. at 11. Thus,
guaranty association assessments can be made over several years. Id. at 15. In 1991, the
guaranty associations' national aggregate annual assessment capacity was $784 million for
annuity contracts. See infra Section I D 2.
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benefits than was promised by PBGC.9 Moreover, if the state
regulator decides to rehabilitate an insurance company, instead of
liquidate it, pensioners who rely on products of the seized company
for their monthly income may receive only a percentage of that fixed
income while the company is in conservatorship."0  Such
occurrences are not consistent with ERISA's mission to secure
promised retirement benefits for employees."
PBGC's position that its guaranties do not apply to insurance
annuities is premised on a strained reading of the law, 2 which has
not been tested in court.13  In fact, its current position is contrary
to its interpretation of the legislation of merely eleven years ago.
14
Given the current state of the insurance industry and the fact that
three million workers and retirees rely on insurance-backed annuities
to provide their pension payments,' 5 the PBGC should insure the
benefits of all pensioners who rely on insurance products, participants
in pension plans that are terminated, 6 participants who are switched
to annuities while the plan is ongoing, 7 and participants in defined
contribution plans that invest in insurance annuities and guaranteed
investment contracts (GIC's).'8 This goal can be accomplished by
9 Id. at 63.
to One month after the seizure of Executive Life, annuitants received 70% of their
benefits pursuant to court order. Insurance Company Solvency, supra note 3, at 115
(statement of Senator Richard Bryan).
1 See infra Section II A.
12 Section 4022 of ERISA requires PBGC to ensure payment of pension benefits at
the time of termination; however, overseeing the purchase of annuity contracts from an
unstable insurer is not ensuring payment. See infra Section IV A.
13 Pension Annuity Protection, Pt. I, supra note 2, at 77 (testimony of Joseph
Delfico, Dir., Income Security Issues, Human Resources Div.).
14 Id., Pt. I, supra note 2, at 68 (testimony of Norman Stein, Prof. of Law, Univ.
of Alabama). See infra Section IV.
15 Private Pensions: Millions of Workers Lose Federal Benefit Protection at
Retirement. Report to the Chairman, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,
U.S. Senate. Lawrence H. Thompson, Assistant Comptroller General, 4 (1991) [Hereinafter
Private Pensions]. "About 7.9 million private pension plan retirees receive annuities. An
additional 1.9 million pensioners receive annuities as surviving dependents of a deceased
retiree. Annuities are paid either by the plan itself (plan annuities) or by an insurance
company (insurance annuities)." Id. at 5. It is estimated that "between 3 and 4 million
retirees and their survivors receive benefits payments from insurance companies." Id.
16 See infra Section II B.
17 See infra Section II B.
is See infra Section 11 C.
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remodeling the PBGC after the Securities Investor Protection
Corporation (SIPC), which guarantees the funds and securities
holdings of persons with accounts placed with a broker-dealer.' 9
Part II of this comment will discuss the purpose of ERISA. It will
examine the two types of plans qualified under ERISA and will
establish the causes of pensioners' reliance on insurance products, the
effects of insurance insolvency on pension plan participants, and the
effect of the application of state laws on participants. In order to
illustrate the great risk that insurance investments pose to pensioners,
part III will address the two major causes of insurance industry
insolvency, investment in junk bonds and real estate, and will discuss
the inadequacies of industry regulation. Part IV explores the
legislative history behind the creation of the PBGC and offers a
proposal for remodeling the PBGC after SIPC to make it the insurer
of all pension funds with investments in the insurance industry. Part
V concludes.
II. PENSION PLANS AND INSURANCE PRODUCTS
A. ERISA
Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security
Ace in 1974 to act in conjunction with Internal Revenue Code
2'
(IRC) provisions 2 to encourage the development of private pension
plans23 and to secure promised retirement benefits for employees.24
Legislative history reveals that ERISA was passed in response to the
19 See infra Section IV.
2 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982)) [hereinafter ERISA].
21 26 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1986).
22 Title II of ERISA contains amendments to the pension provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code. Norman Stein, Raiders of the Corporate Pension Plan: The Reversion of
Excess Plan Assets to the Employer, 5 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 117, 120 at n.13 (1986).
2 ERISA encouraged the establishment of plans by offering preferential tax treatment
for plan contributions. IRC § 404(a)(1). Norman Stein, Reversions from Pension Plans:
History, Policies, and Prospects, 44 TAX L. REv. 259, 261 (1989).
24 The most significant changes that ERISA made to secure promised benefits were:
1) The establishment of minimum vesting standards, 2) The increasing of employer's
minimum annual plan contributions, and 3) Creating the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corp.
(PBGC) to insure defined benefits. Stein. supra note 22. at 124.
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loss of pension benefits by thousands of plan participants prior to
1974.'5 For example, in 1963, the Studebaker company was shut
down and 4,500 workers lost 85% of their promised benefits due to
inadequate funding of the company's pension plan. 6  Congress
wanted to ensure that, thereafter, participants in pension plans could
rely on the "timely and uninterrupted payment of pension
benefits. ''27  To ensure promised retirement benefits, ERISA
established the Pension Benefits Guaranty Corporation (PBGC),2 a
a government corporation primarily financed by insurance premiums
paid by plan sponsors.29 Section 4022(a) of ERISA provides that
"the corporation shall guarantee, in accordance with this section, the
payment of all nonforfeitable benefits ... under a single-employer
plan which terminates at the time when this title applies to it." The
two major types of pension plans which are qualified for favorable
tax treatment under ERISA and the IRC are the defined benefit
plan3" and the defined contribution plan.3
B. Defined Benefit Plans
In a defined benefit plan, the sponsoring employer promises to
pay the employee a specified benefit upon retirement.3 2 The benefit
25 Private Pensions, supra note 15, at 147 (testimony of Lawrence Thompson,
Assistant Comptroller General).
26 Id.
2 ERISA, § 4002(a)(2).
28 Title IV of ERISA creates the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation as an insurer
of certain defined benefit plans. Stein, supra note 22, at 120 n.31. See, ERISA, §§ 4021 -
22B. "The PBGC also has broad regulatory powers to investigate whether plans are
solvent, ERISA, § 4003(a); to involuntarily terminate insolvent plans, ERISA, § 4042(a);
and to supervise the voluntary termination of covered defined benefit plans, ERISA, §
4041." Id. at 120.
29 Guarantees of Retirement Annuities: Hearing before the Senate Committee on
Finance, 102nd Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1990) [hereinafter Guarantees of Retirement Annuities]
(statement of Sen. Lloyd Bentsen). Single-employer defined benefit plans pay a premium
of $16 per participant, underfunded plans pay additional premium of up to $34. See infra
Section IV A for a detailed analysis of the legislative history of the PBGC.
30 ERISA § 3(25), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35) (1982).
31 ERISA § 3(34), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (1982).
32 Stein, supra note 22, at 121. Today, 12 million retirees are receiving $220 billion
in pension benefits, annually. One half of the American work force is covered by a pension
plan and 50% of these are defined benefit plans. Pension Annuity Protection, Pt. L supra
note 2, at 9 (statement of Sherwood Boehlert, U.S. Congressman, N.Y.).
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is calculated based on the participant's compensation, service, or a
combination of the two.33 Once the benefit is determined, the
employer makes contributions to a common fund based on annual
actuarial determinations such that the contributions will suffice to pay
the participant's promised benefits at normal retirement age. 4 The
employer bears the market risk of investments made to meet the
obligation." Defined benefit plans are guaranteed by PBGC; if the
plan assets are insufficient to cover its promised benefits, PBGC pays
the benefits.36 However, under PBGC's current interpretation of
ERISA, defined benefit plan participants may be robbed of their
federal PBGC protection as a result of annuitization of ongoing plans
and as a result of plan reversions.37
Defined benefit plan sponsors with ongoing plans often annuitize
retirees each year in order to lower administrative costs and avoid
PBGC premiums.38 Of the three to four million retirees receiving
annuities, most were covered by ongoing plans.39 Moreover, federal
law permits an employer to capture surplus assets in a defined
benefit plan by terminating the plan and purchasing annuities from
an insurer to meet benefit commitments to participants and beneficia-
ries.4° Excess funds in defined benefit plans result from a number
of factors; the large investment yield which pension trusts received
in recent years,4' higher long term interest rates which served to
33 John Abbott, Legislating Reversions: A Mistaken Path Leading to Drastic Results.
26 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1109, 1114 (1989).
34 d. at 1116.
35 Barbara McGeoch, The American Voluntary Pension System: Can it Thrive Under
a No-Reversion Rule?, 43 TAX LAw. 773. 775 (1990).
3 Id. at 776. See infra Section IV A.
37 See generally, Stein, supra note 22. See infra Section IV A.
38 Certain Issues Related to the Conservatorship, supra note 3, at 82 n. 1 (testimony
of Joseph Delfico, Director Income Security Issues, Human Resources Division).
39 d. at 82.
40 ERISA, § 4044(d)(1). Reversions are allowed on the assumption that excess funds
were created through "erroneous actuarial computations." 26 C.F.R. § 1.401.2(b) (1987).
Since defined benefit plans promise a specific benefit at retirement, it is logical that
overfunding be returned to the employer at the time of plan termination. Arguably.
Congress did not envision plan terminations for the purpose of obtaining excess funds.
Congress is currently trying to curb abuses of the law through the enactment of various bills.
See generally, Abbott, supra note 33, at Section m A.
41 Abbott. supra note 33. at 1118.
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lower the cost of annuity contracts,42 the use of projected salary
amounts in determining funding,43 the use of conservative long term
investment assumptions by plan actuaries," and recent legislative
cutbacks on maximum benefit limitations. 5
During the 1980's, these excess funds in company pension plans
appealed to corporate raiders.46 These raiders took over companies
with surplus benefits through leveraged buyouts intending to revert
the overfunded plan and use the excess funds to pay back the interest
on the buyout.4 7 Existing plan sponsors may also view the surplus
assets as a cheap source of capital, which can be used to revive
economically strapped enterprises or to expand healthy ones."
Three conditions must be met for a plan to be reverted.
ERISA 9 and IRC50 require that the plan be permanent,51 it must
be established for the exclusive benefit of the employees and their
beneficiaries,52 and the plan instrument must expressly provide for
a reversion." However, ERISA and IRC permit reversions where
all liabilities have been satisfied, notwithstanding the fact that the
42 Id.
43 Some funding methods lead to greater contributions than other methods. For
example, using the level funding method, an employer estimates what an employee will be
earning when he reaches retirement age and contributes to the fund based on the projected
salary. This alleviates increased contributions toward the end of the worker's career.
McGeoch, supra note 35, at 779.
Abbott, supra note 33, at 1118.
45 Id.
46 Pension Annuity Protection, Pt. I, supra note 2, at 10 (statement of Sherwood
Boehlert, U.S. Congressman, N.Y.).
47 See generally, Pension Annuity Protection, supra note 2. Examples of this
occurring where annuities were purchased from Executive Life include Revlon (bought out
by Ronald Perelman in Nov. 1985. In Dec. 1985 Perelman initiated the reversion capturing
$40 million in excess) and Pacific Lumber (taken over by Charles Hurwitz and the Maxxam
Group in 1985. In 1986, the plan was reverted and Hurwitz captured $55 million in excess
funds). See Pension Annuity Protection, Pt. I, supra note 2, at 20 (statement of E. Schefer,
Retiree from Revlon Co.); Id. at 28 (statement of J. Lewis, Attorney for Annuitants of
Pacific Lumber Co.).
48 Stein, supra note 22, at 127.
49 26 U.S.C. § 401 (1986).
so 26 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1986).
S1 Abbott, supra note 33, at 1119.
52 Id.
.3 Id. at 1120.
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plan is established for the exclusive benefit of the employees.'M
Moreover, if an original plan instrument does not provide for
reversions, it may be amended to provide for them.5" Thus, an
employer can legally terminate a pension plan, cause the plan to
satisfy its liabilities by purchasing annuity contracts for plan
participants and their beneficiaries, and then recover the remaining
assets.56
There are several techniques by which an employer may receive
a reversion.57 The first of these is a standard plan termination: The
employer terminates the defined benefit plan and offers the plan
participants annuities designed to provide each employee with the
benefit he has accrued to date.58 Once the annuities are purchased,
the employer may take the remaining assets as a reversion.59 Often
the least expensive annuities are purchased to increase the amount of
the reversion.6° ERISA requires only that the annuities be pur-
chased from an insurer licensed in the state;6' there are no further
restrictions on choosing an insurer.62 However, the choice of an
insurer is an investment decision subject to the fiduciary duties of
ERISA.63
The second method by which an employer can receive a reversion
is the spinoff termination. Using this technique, a single plan is
divided into two plans, one comprised of retired employees, one
5 Id. at 1119.
55 Id. at 1120.
5 Stein, supra note 22, at 118.
57 Abbott, supra note 33, at 1122.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Pension Annuity Protection, -Pt. I. supra note 2, at 34 (testimony of Jeffrey Lewis,
Esq.).
6 Certain Issues Related to the Conservatorship, supra note 3. at 63 (testimony of
James Lockhart, Exec. Dir. PBGC).
6 Title I ERISA contains no criteria for the purchase of insurance company
annuities. Pension Annuity Protection, Pt.1, supra note 2, at 5 (statement of Rep. Matthew
Rinaldo).
6 Id. at 37 (testimony of Jeffrey Lewis, Attorney for Annuitants of Pacific Lumber
Co.). The Department of Labor (DOL) has the power to investigate a plan sponsor's choice
of an annuity provider; however, DOL has not responded quickly to complaints. For
example, investigations into the selection of Executive Life as an annuity provider which
were opened in 1987 were still ongoing in 1991. d. at 49.
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comprised of current employees." The excess assets are placed in
the retired employees' plan, which is then terminated so that the
funds revert to the employer.65
The third technique of reverting assets is termination and
reestablishment.66 Here a defined benefit plan is terminated, the
employer recaptures the excess funds and then establishes a new
defined benefit plan or a defined contribution plan.67
PBGC currently takes the position that it does not provide
coverage for a defined benefit plan once the annuities are purchased
to satisfy the plan liabilities.68 The corporation argues that its
guaranties are triggered by the termination of plans with insufficient
funds and, since annuitants have received a full distribution of their
pension share in the form of insurance annuity contracts, the
corporation's guaranties do not cover them if their annuity provider
becomes insolvent.69  The next level of protection for annuitants
who are previous members of PBGC-insured defined benefit plans is
the state guaranty funds.7"
C. Defined Contribution Plans
In a defined contribution plan, the employer makes no representa-
tions about the level of benefits employees can expect to receive
upon retirement. 7 The employer promises to make contributions
to a trust, wherein the contributions are allocated among participating
64 Abbott, supra note 33, at 1125.
65 Id.
6 Id. at 1127.
67 Id.
6 Pension Annuity Protection, Pt. I, supra note 2, at 163 (letter of C. Flowe, General
Counsel, PBGC). See infra Section IV A.
9 Certain Issues Related to the Conservatorship, supra note 3, at 13 (testimony of
John Garamendi, Insurance Commissioner, State of CA).
70 Private Pensions, supra note 15, at 152 (Lawrence Thompson, Assistant
Comptroller General).
71 McGeoch, supra note 35 at 775 (quoting Stein, Raiders of the Corporate Pension
Plan: The Reversion of Excess Plan Assets to the Employer, 5 AM. J. TAX POL'Y. 121)
The term "defined contribution plan" is defined as a pension plan which provides for
an individual account for each participant and for benefits based solely upon the amount
contributed to the participant's account, and any income, expenses, gains and losses, and any
forfeitures of accounts for other participants' account. ERISA, § 3(34), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34)
(1982). See Abbott, supra note 33, at 1116.
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employees and then invested for their benefit.7 2  The employee
expects to receive the amount contributed to the plan (e.g. his
deferred payments plus employer contributions) plus earnings upon
his retirement or another specified event such as separation from
service, layoff, or disability.73 In a defined contribution plan, the
employee, not the employer, bears the investment risk.74 Increasing
numbers of plan sponsors are deciding to terminate defined benefit
plans and replace them with defined contribution plans.75 Addition-
ally, many new plans offer only defined contribution plans. 6
Although defined contribution plans are not insured by the
PBGC,7 sponsors often invest these plans with insurance companies
and the pensioners receive annuities;7 thus, they are equally
affected by insurance company insolvency as participants in defined
benefit plans and they ultimately depend on the same patchwork of
state laws. Additionally, of 174 large pension plans, 28% of the
defined contribution plan assets are held in Guaranteed Investment
Contracts (GIC's) issued by insurance companies."
GIC's are similar to certificates of deposit.80 They are fixed
rate, fixed term debt instruments.8' This investment enables
pensioners to avoid negative account balances because GICs do not
fluctuate in market value.82 Although the rate of return is guaran-
72 Stein, supra note 22, at 121.
"3 Id.
74 Id.
75 Employee Benefit Items: Shift to Defined Contribution Plans Due to Sponsor's
Choices, 271, 272, 7 TAX MGMT. FIN. PLAN. J., July 16, 1991.
76 Id.
7 Private Pensions, supra note 15, at 148. While the plan termination insurance
provisions of ERISA do not affect defined contribution plans, these plans are subject to the
fiduciary requirements of ERISA, the reporting and disclosure requirements, and the
participation and vesting requirements. The minimum funding requirements of ERISA had
"almost no impact on the few defined contribution plans they affected." Donald Grubbs,
Defined Benefit Plans vs. Defined Contribution Plans: A Reassessment, J. PENSION PLAN.
& COMPLANCE 97, 101 (1989).
78 Private Pensions, supra note 15, at 150.
79 Pension Annuity Protection, Pt.I, supra note 2, at 58 (statement of Joseph Delfico.
Dir. Income Security Issues, Human Resources Division).
In contrast, in defined benefit plans only 2% of all assets are held in GIC's.
so Certain Issues Related to the Conservatorship, supra note 2, at 10 (testimony of
John Garamendi, Insurance Commissioner, State of California).
81 Nancy Dunnan, Dunn & Bradstreet: Guide to your Investments 263 (1991).
82 Grubbs, supra note 77. at 111.
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teed by the issuer, "no specific pool of funds backs a GIC and most
are not backed by federal insurance or government guarantees.,
8 3
"Instead, the assets of the insurance carrier back the principal
contract, so any default of an underlying issue or drop in interest
rates is absorbed by the insurance company.'" For the investor,
GIC's are unmarketable and illiquid; penalties are charged if they are
cashed in before maturity. 5 As aforesaid, defined contribution
plans are not guaranteed by PBGC; the only coverage for GIC
holders in the event of an insurance company insolvency are the state
guaranty funds.
D. State Insurance Insolvency Laws
1. Liquidation Proceedings
Once pensioners are outside of the PBGC's guaranties, they are
simply policy holders of the insolvent insurance company. They
must compete with other creditors for distribution of the company's
assets. Pursuant to the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 6 the regulation of
insurers, including treatment of insolvency, is the responsibility of
the state legislature and regulatory agencies of the state where the
company is domiciled.8' The states are aided by uniform laws that
allow consistent treatment of claims arising in a number of states
against a particular insurer.' The majority of the states have
adopted a version of one of two uniform laws dealing with insurance
insolvency. Thirty-two states have adopted the Uniform Insurers
8 Dunnan, supra note 81, at 263.
4 Id.
as James Cheeks, The Dow Jones - Irwin Guide to Keoghs 84 (1989).
86 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1982). Section 1011 of the Act provides that "the
continued regulation and taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is in the
public interest, and that silence on the part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose
any barrier to the regulation and taxation of such business by the several states."
7 Frank Darr, Federal Claims in Insurance Insolvencies,
TORT & INs. L. J. 601, 603.
u Id. at 602. However, many provisions of the proposals have extra-territorial effect
and sometimes non-domiciliary courts refuse to recognize their validity. See Davis Howard,
Uncle Sam Versus the Ins. Comm'rs: A Multi-level Approach to Defining the "Business of
Insurance" Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 25 W.HIAMETME L. REV. 1, 10.
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Liquidation Act (UILA). 89 Thirteen states have adopted the Insurers
Supervision, Rehabilitation and Liquidation Model Act.90
Each of these insurance solvency statutes provides for the
standard activities associated with the administration of a bankrupt-
cy. 9' The state's insurance commissioner is appointed as liquida-
tor;92 in this role, he will marshall assets, identify claims, distribute
assets, deposit company records, and close the liquidation.93 The
order of asset distribution is as follows: Administrative expenses are
paid first; next come salaries of the company's employees, then
policyholders, beneficiaries, third party claimants, and guaranty
associations are paid; finally, the general creditors receive any
remaining assets.' Since an insolvent insurer's liabilities usually
exceed assets, and since administrative expenses are substantial,
policy holders rarely receive 100 cents on the dollar.95 For policy
holders, this loss is mitigated by the state guaranty associations.
96
2. The State Guaranty Funds
Forty-seven states have some form of guaranty association in
place to guard against annuity holder losses due to the failure of
insurance companies. 97 Only sixteen of these states provide some
form of coverage for GIC holders.9" When an insolvency occurs,
the guaranty association raises the funds to meet contract obligations
by assessing the insurance companies licensed to do business in the
state.99 Each company is assessed based on its pro-rata share of
89 Darr, supra note 87, at 616 n.124, citing 13 U.S.C. § 321 (1986 & Supp. 1988).
90 Id. at 616 note 124. 2 MODEL INSURANCE LAWS, REGULATIONS AND
GUIDELINES, 555-1, 555-44-47. (Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs)(1984 & Supp 1987).
91 Id. at 616.
92 Howard, supra note 88, at 9.
93 Darr, supra note 87, at 617.
94 Howard, supra note 88, at 10.
95 Id. at 13.
6 Id. at 14.
97 Pension Annuity Protection, Pt. 1, supra note 2. at 5 (statement of Rep. Matthew
Rinaldo).
" See infra notes 110-112 and accompanying text.
9 Hearing on Life Insurance Guarantee Funds. supra note 8. at 10 (statement of
Marcia Horton for the American Council of Life Insurers).
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total premiums in the previous year."°° Policy holders must wait
while the association raises funds to meet the obligations of the
insolvent insurer. °1 Although insurance companies pay into the
guaranty funds, their assessments are deducted from income for
federal income tax purposes and it is ultimately the tax payers who
pay for insolvencies.' °2
There are two basic models for the protection offered by
states.1°' First, some state laws guarantee benefits for annuitants
who hold annuities issued by companies headquartered in that state,
regardless of where the annuitants reside.')4 Under the second
model, state laws guarantee their own residents against loss if the
failed company was licensed to do business in that state at the time
it failed.10 5 These models, coupled with the three states that do not
provide guaranty funds,o' create a patchwork of coverage for
annuitants depending on where they reside and where the issuing
insurance company is headquartered.
0 7
States also place varying limits on the amount of individual
coverage. Twenty-two states limit coverage of individual annuities
100 Id. at 11. Total assessments for any year cannot exceed a fixed percentage of the
company's premiums written in the state during the preceding year for the type of policy
being covered.
101 Id.
102 Dart, supra note 87, at 621. "The solvent insurers then pass these costs to their
customers or the public through either premium increases or premium tax deductions." Id.
103 Pension Annuity Protection, Pt. I, supra note 2, at 57 (statement of Joseph
Delfico, Dir. Income Security Issues, Human Resources Division).
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id. The three areas that do not provide guaranty funds are New Jersey, the District
of Columbia, and Colorado.
107 Example:
Consider a pensioner in New Jersey, a state which has no guarantee law. If
the failed insurance company's headquarters are in New Jersey, or one of the
other jurisdictions without a guarantee law, such as D.C., the pensioner
would not receive any protection. Similarly, if the insurance company was
headquartered in a state such as Texas or Florida, which only guarantee their
own residents, there would not be any protection. A New Jersey resident
would be protected only if the failed insurance company was headquartered
in a state, like Virginia or Pennsylvania, that guarantees all company policies
regardless of where the pensioner resides.
Id. at 70.
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to $100,000 in present value." 8 Other states limit coverage to
$300,000.19 Moreover, within the patchwork of state laws, there
is significant variation among the states in the treatment of Unalloc-
ated Funding Obligations (UFO's), which include GIC's."' Twen-
ty states have not yet explicitly addressed whether or how such
products are covered; two states cover them fully; fourteen states
limit coverage; and thirteen states exclude UFO's from coverage."'
The states that do insure GIC's generally provide a $5 million limit
of protection for any one contract holder (regardless of how many
employees are under the contract)." 2  In March 1990, IDS Finan-
cial Services stated that "the insolvency of one or more major
insurers conceivably could lead to the collapse of the state guaranty
system by exceeding its current administrative and financial capacity
to deal with large losses.""' 3
This section (II B-D) has discussed why millions of pension plan
participants ultimately rely on insurance products for payment of
their benefits and how, in the event of an insurance company
insolvency, many of them will be deprived of their benefits because
of the inconsistencies in state coverages. The next section will
illustrate the breadth of the insurance company insolvency issue and
demonstrate that, unless the federal government guarantees the
pension benefits of American retirees, ERISA will fail in its goal to
guarantee the "timely and uninterrupted payment of pension bene-
fits."
108 Id. at 57. This totals about $944 a month.
109 Hearing on Life Insurance Guarantee Funds. supra note 8. at 4 (statement of
Marcia Horton for the American Council of Life Insurance). $300,000 is the NAIC Model
Act Limit.
120 Id. at 7 (testimony of Eden Sarfaty, President. National Organization of Life and
Health Insurance Guaranty Associations). "Unallocated funding obligations (UFOs). are
'group' contracts that are not issued to and owned by an individual, and do not provide
guarantees to any individual . I..." d.
II Pension Annuity Protection, Pt. I. supra note 2, at 91 (testimony of Eden Sarfaty.
President National Organization of Life and Health Insurance Guarantee Associations).
112 Id. at 92.
113 Hearing on Life Insurance Guarantee Funds, supra note 8, at 1 (statement of
Cardiss Collins, Chairwoman). But see Id. at 10 (testimony of Sarfaty). The annual
financial capacity of the life-health insurance guaranty system is approximately $3.06
billion. This is based on a total premium base of $165.8 billion. An average of $110,312
was assessed nationally for life, health and annuity lines in the three year period 1987
through 1989. That is less than 4% of total annual assessment capacity. Id.
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IH. INSURANCE INSOLVENCY
Until the 1980's, the insurance industry was stable: its long term
liabilities, such as death benefits and annuities, allowed it to be a
long term, low risk investor.11 4  However, the destabilization of
interest rates in the 1980's caused life insurance consumers to
become interested in the rate of return rather than in security, and the
industry was forced to adapt to consumers' demands."5  The
industry switched from pure life products to investment products and
mixed life/investment products in order to benefit from the high
interest rates. 6 This transition increased the industry's involve-
ment with defined benefit plans and defined contribution plans. The
insurance industry's involvement with defined benefit pension plans
grew as the demand for annuity and pension products increased more
rapidly than sales of life insurance." 7 Also, the industry's involve-
ment with defined contribution plans grew as more employers
switched to providing defined contribution plans"' and as
purchases of GIC's became more popular.
GIC's are an example of the new short term, high interest
investment product which changed the nature of the insurance
114 Hearing on Insurance Solvency, supra note 3, at 2 (testimony of Terrence
Lennon, Ass't. Deputy Superintendent and Chief Examiner N.Y. State Insurance Dep't.).
"The stability and predictability of these long term liabilities afforded the industry a
significant partial immunity from normal interest cycles and to some extent from other
economic cycles." Id.
11s Id. at 4.
116 Examples of new products are universal life and variable rate annuities. Insurance
Company Solvency, supra note 3, at 160 (statement of Martin Weiss, President, Weiss
Research, Inc.).
117 Hearing on Insurance Solvency, supra note 3, at 3 (testimony of Terrence Lennon,
Ass't. Deputy Superintendent and Chief Examiner N.Y. State Insurance Dep't.). The





Source: ACLI 1990 Fact Book.
118 Employee Benefit Items: Shift to Defined Contribution Plans Due to Sponsor's
Choices, 7 Tax MGMT. Fin. Plan. J. 271, 272, July 16, 1991.
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industry. A GIC is a "general asset debt obligation of an insurance
company."" 9  They are typically written with three to five year
maturities, and thus reduce the average liability duration of insur-
ers. 2' Seeking to match these high yield liabilities, the industry
increased the yield on its asset base with junk bonds and real estate
investments.1
2'
The quality of the insurance industry's assets currently suffers
from the contraction of the junk bond market and poor real estate
investments. 2  High-interest/high-risk investments in junk bonds
enabled insurance companies to match assets to their new high yield
products.123  However, the decline of the price of junk bonds and
their record level of defaults, 24 which began in the late 1980's,
impaired the asset base of insurance companies, who own 30% of all
junk bonds.2' Therefore, pension plans that invest in insurance
companies' products are ultimately affected by the junk bond
defaults. 26  At the end of 1990, the insurance industry had $85
billion invested in junk bonds but only $109 billion in capital,
surplus and loan loss reserves. 127  "Thirty-seven companies, ac-
counting for about 16% of the industry's invested assets, have junk
bond portfolios in excess of 100% of their surplus (including
19 Hubert Forcier, The Growing Market for Retirement Products. v. 6, Bottomline.
Feb. 1989, at 44.
120 Hearing on Insurance Solvency, supra note 3. at 7 (testimony of Terrence Lennon,
N.Y. Department of Insurance).
121 Insurance Company Solvency, supra note 3. at 160 (testimony of Martin Weiss.
President, Weiss Research Inc.).
122 Gil Marmol & John Shuck, Testing the Mettle of Life Insurers: Although the
Turmoil of the 1980's has Subsided, the 1990's Will Pose Equally Demanding Challenges
for Life Insurers, BEsT's REVIEW - Life/Health Insurance Edition, April 1991. at 16.
[Hereinafter Testing the Mettle].
123 Insurance Company Solvency, supra note 3, at 160 (testimony of Martin Weiss.
President, Weiss Research Inc.).
124 Hearing on Insurance Solvency, supra note 3. at 2 (statement of Cardiss Collins,
Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer Protection, and Competitiveness).
In 1990, $22 billion in junk bonds defaulted. In the first five months of 1991. S11.7 billion
defaulted.
125 Gary Hector, Junk's Bad Times Are Just Starting, FORTUNE. June 4. 1990. at 81.
85.
'26 Id. at 81.
'.1 Hearing on Insurance Solvency. supra note 3. at II (testimony of Martin Weiss.
President. Weiss Research Inc.).
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MSVR, the mandatory securities valuation reserve)." '  Twelve
companies with about 5% of the industry's assets have junk bond
holdings in excess of 200% of surplus (including MSVR). 29
This high concentration of junk bonds was effectively concealed
for many years for two reasons; statutory accounting practices 3 '
and inaccurate bond quality designations previously used by the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). 3'
Under statutory accounting practices which insurance companies keep
for industry regulators, the companies carry junk bonds at or near
cost rather than at market value.'32 This practice conceals insurers'
losses until the sale of the securities.'33 Such inaccuracy is com-
pounded by the faulty NAIC quality designations for bonds held by
insurance companies." Bonds identified as "speculative invest-
ments" (junk bonds) by Moody's or Standard & Poor's were
classified as "investment grade" by insurance regulators. For
example, under NAIC's old rating method, First Capital Life
Insurance Company (CA) appeared to have 20.2% of its invested
assets in junk bonds, based on 1989 data.'35  First Capital Life
actually held 40.7% of its investments in junk bonds. 36 Similarly,
the 1990 data which reflects NAIC's new, more realistic rating
12s Testing the Mettle, supra note 122, at 94.
129 Id.
130 Junk's Bad Times Are Just Starting, supra note 125, at 82.
131 Hearing on Insurance Solvency, supra note 3, at 3 (testimony of Martin Weiss,
President, Weiss Research Inc.).
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) uses the following incorrect
designations for bond quality:
I. NAIC Class I bonds = highest quality. However, most of these bonds are
rated AA or A by S&P or Moody's.
2. NAIC Class 2 bonds = high quality. Moody's and S&P say these are
medium grade bonds with "speculative characteristics" (near junk).
3. NAIC Class 3 bonds = medium grade. Actually, these are junk bonds.
132 Junk's Bad Times Are Just Starting, supra note 125, at 82.
133 Id.
134 Hearing on Insurance Solvency, supra note 3, at 11 (testimony of Martin Weiss,
President, Weiss Research Inc.). Until 1989, the companies used the old NAIC definitions
and reported that they held $51 billion in junk bonds. The correct total is near $85 billion.
135 Insurance Company Solvency, supra note 3, at 170 (testimony of Martin Weiss,
President, Weiss Research, Inc.).
136 Id.
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system, reveals that Executive Life (CA) held 67.7% of its assets in
junk bonds instead of the 50.7% previously claimed)
37
In addition to the public junk bond market, insurance companies
also purchase junk bonds directly from below investment grade
companies.131 Into the 1990's, insurance companies were major
investors in private placements. For example, as of January 1991,
Prudential had $34 billion in private placements, Cigna had $12
billion and Metropolitan Life had a $14 billion private placement
portfolio.139  However, NAIC has now imposed stricter guidelines
for such private placements which will prohibit companies from
investing in below investment grade companies."4
In addition to the public and private placement junk bond
investments, many insurance companies have large holdings in
investment grade bonds with speculative characteristics.' 4' These
are "near junk" bonds which carry triple B ratings. 42  When near
junk bond investments are combined with the junk bond holdings of
many insurance companies, the result is a large holding of low
quality bonds. 43
137 Id.
138 Laura Jereski, If in Doubt. Downgrade it!. FORBES. Jan. 7, 1991, at 52.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 57. To illustrate, Continental Cablevision offered a $150 million private
issue prior to November 1990, but was forced to withdraw it when NAIC issued the new
guidelines for insurance companies.
141 Hearing on Insurance Solvency, supra note 3. at 5 (testimony of Martin Weiss.
President, Weiss Research, Inc.).
142 Id. These bonds are rated BAA by Moody's. Moody's assessment of them is as
follows:
Bonds which are rated BAA are considered as medium grade obligations, i.e., they
are neither highly protected or poorly secured. Interest payments and principal
security appear adequate for the present. but certain protective elements may be
lacking or may be characteristically unreliable over any great length of time.
Such bonds lack outstanding investment characteristics and in fact have
speculative characteristics as well.
Id. at 5.
The default rate for these bonds between 1970 and 1990 was 5.7% after 15 years.
Additionally 15% of these bonds were downgraded to junk bonds within 5 years
of their issue date.
Id. at 6.
143 Insurance Company Solvency. supra note 3. at 172 (testimony of Martin Weiss.
President, Weiss Research, Inc.).
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Low grade bond holdings represent only one threat to insurance
solvency; another major risk is the industry's investments in real
estate and mortgages.'" Total mortgage and real estate invest-
ments represent over one quarter of the total invested assets of the
life and health insurance industry. 4 5 During the 1980's, some
companies' real estate holdings comprised 45% or 50% of their total
invested assets.
46
Like junk bonds, primary and secondary real estate mortgage
obligations are attractive because they are easily match-funded with
the new short term insurance products 47 as well as the more
traditional long term obligations. Regarding primary mortgage
obligations, one form of loan which became popular in the 1980's to
The following is a sampling of low quality bond holdings of U.S. life insurance
companies:




Lincoln Liberty Life Ins. 71.0 0.7 71.6
Executive Life of NY 65.5 3.1 68.6
Executive Life of Ca. 67.7 0.8 68.5
United Pacific Life 32.9 31.9 64.8
Colonial Penn. Annuity 16.4 47.3 63.7
& Life Ins. Co. 6
Id. at 184.
144 Thomas Borman, Hitting the Mark on Real Estate Values, BEST'S REVIEW, April
1991, vol. 91, no. 12., at 18.
145 Maggie Mahar, The Great Collapse: Commercial Real Estate is on the Skids
Across the Nation, BARRON'S, July 22, 1991, 10, 22. "In 1980 insurers had $100 billion
invested in commercial real estate; by 1991, their commitment had grown to over $260
billion .. " Life insurers are responsible for over $250 billion of the $260 billion of the
industry's commitment. Id.
146 Borman, supra note 144, at 18. Moreover, an insurer's portfolio may be deceptive
as to quantity of real estate holdings. Portfolios may appear diverse with investments in real
estate, bonds, stocks, etc.; however, many bonds are mortgage backed. See Mark Ellis,
Managers and Dodging Bullets, PENSION WORLD, Feb. 1990, at 52, 53.
147 Id. See also Hearing on Insurance Solvency, supra note 3, at 16 (testimony of
Martin Weiss, President, Weiss Research). There is some correlation between reserves
allocated to GICs and the percentage of investments in mortgages. "Bullet mortgages, with
predetermined pay-offs at a specified date, can and are matched to many GICs. The need
to earn high yields may also have been an incentive to favor mortgages rather than zero-
coupons or Treasury notes." Id
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match-fund GIC liabilities was the bullet loan.'48 This form of
mortgage has a 5, 7, or 10 year maturity and requires little amortiza-
tion of principle during the life of the loan. However, a large
balloon payment is called for at maturity.'49 The problem with
these short term loans is that many mortgages written in 1986, when
interest rates were low, came due in 1991, during a real estate reces-
sion,150 and they rolled over at higher interest rates.' 5' Instead
of new mortgages by new lenders paying the balloon payments, the
insurance companies were faced with refinancing these loans in the
tougher economic marketplace.
5 2
Moreover, the insurance industry has no rating system to evaluate
the quality of its mortgages and real estate investments; therefore, the
amount of mortgages that risk default is inestimable. 153  However,
the industry's statutory filings reveal that in 1990, non-performing
mortgages'"" totaled $11.4 billion.
55
Overall, life insurers' assets invested in primary mortgage obliga-
tions decreased from 36% in 1970, to 27% in 1980, down to 19 %in
1989.156 However, the insurance industry has increased its
investments in secondary mortgage obligations. 157  The traditional
pass through programs, wherein the Government National Mortgage
148 Hearing on Insurance Solvency, supra note 3, at 6 (testimony of Thomas Borman,
Esq., Former Commissioner of the Minnesota Dep't. of Commerce).
149 - id.
ISO Id. at 7. The real estate industry is in its worst condition since the 1930's.
Vacancy rates are rising, rents continue to drop.
151 Hearing on Insurance Solvency, supra note 3, at 2 (statement of Cardiss Collins,
Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer Protection, and Competitiveness).
See also Id. at 6 (testimony of Thomas Borman, Esq.) "According to Solomon Bros., some
$15 billion in loans will come due this year [1991] and another $20 billion in 1992." Id.
152 Id. at 6 (testimony of Thomas Borman, Esq.).
153 Id., at 9 (testimony of Martin Weiss, President, Weiss Research Inc.). No one
knows the amount of mortgages which are 30-60 days overdue, 60-90 days overdue, or
which are "secured by real estate appraised below principal amount," which are "secured by
real estate in depressed regions which has not been appraised or marked to estimated market
within the past two years or more," or "where cash flows and debt load of mortgagee make
loan repayment uncertain." Id.
15 Id. Non-performing mortgages include those which are 90 days overdue, or are in
the process of foreclosure, or have been foreclosed during the calendar year.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 10 (testimony of Terrence Lennon, N.Y. Insurance Dept.).
157 Id.
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Association (Ginnie Mae) or the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation (Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae) guarantee the timely
receipt of payments from pools of mortgages, are unresponsive to the
insurance industry's new short term needs because these programs
have final payment dates of up to 30 years.' Once insurers sell
GIC's to pension funds, promising to pay a fixed rate over a specific
number of years, the insurance company must put that money to
work at more than the fixed rate.'59 Mortgage backed bonds thus
offer a more attractive vehicle to the insurance industry. First, they
offer an intermediate term (5-10 years). Second, since the
obligations are overcollateralized by mortgages, they receive ratings
as high as the government insured pass-through programs.' °
Although secondary mortgage obligations are highly rated, they carry
risks to medium term investors because the underlying mortgages are
subject to prepayment. During periods of falling interest rates, a
high percentage of the underlying mortgage pool may be prepaid and
the investor will have to reinvest this early return at the lower
interest rates.16 ' A new investment vehicle, the Collateralized
Mortgage Obligation (CMO), was created in 1983 to reduce this call
risk.
162
CMO's allow insurance companies to structure individualized
mortgage portfolios 63 and meet both short term GIC obliga-
tions"' and long term death liabilities. The CMO can be divided
into four or more tranches with different maturities."5 Banks and
thrifts tend to be interested in the earlier ("fast pay") tranches, while
life insurance companies and pension funds prefer the intermediate
1s8 Brant Mailer, The Collateralized Mortgage Obligation: The Latest Phase in the
Evolution of Mortgage-Backed Securities, 13 REAL EST. L.J. 299, 300-303 (1985).
159 Mahar, supra note 145, at 22.
1W Mailer, supra note 158, at 303-305.
161 Edwin Duett, An Economic Analysis of REMIC's, 18 REAL EsT. REv. 66, 67
(Winter, 1989).
16 Clarence Elebash & William Christiansen, Are Pension Funds Losing Interest in
Mortgage Securities?, 18 REAL EsT. REv. 79, 82 (Winter, 1989).
263 Evan Guillemin, Insurers Play Greater Role in Market, AMERICAN BANKER, Oct.
23, 1989, at 12.
' Id. at 17.
16s David Richards, "Gradable and Tradable": The Securitization of Commercial Real
Estate Mortgages, 16 REAL EST. L.J. 99, 108 (1987).
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and later ("slow pay") tranches. 6  Prepayment in a CMO is
consolidated into the shortest tranche of the multiclass maturity
structure. Once the shortest tranche is retired, then subsequent
prepayments are funneled into the next tranche, until each is
retired. 167  The price yield of each class reflects its exposure to
prepayment and the later tranches are protected from prepay-
ment.' 68 However, these later tranches, which insurance companies
invest in, are risky investments. They are last in line for principal
repayments, so as the underlying mortgages are prepaid, the
underlying collateral pool shrinks.
6 9
Insurers' risks in real estate are compounded by the fact that the
companies have shifted from residential to commercial invest-
ments."7 Commercial loans comprised 34% of mortgages in 1969
and 81% in 1989.1
71
Junk bond and real estate investments led to the insurance
industry's weak financial condition; however, the risk involved in
purchasing insurance products has been further increased by certain
accounting practices. These practices distort insurance companies'
financial statements and make them appear strong. Two such
practices are reinsurance' and surplus notes."'
"[R]einsurance is a 'contract whereby one insurer [the reinsurer]
for a consideration contracts with another [the reinsured or ceding
company] to indemnify it [the reinsured or ceding company] against
loss or liability by reason of a risk which the latter has assumed
under a separate and distinct contract as the insurer of a third
person'."' 74  Thus, reinsurance is insurance for insurance compa-
nies. However, the reinsurance policy is one of indemnity and not
16 Mailer, supra note 158, at 307-308.
16 Duett, supra note 161, at 67.
168 Id
16 Guillemin, supra note 163, at 17.
170 Hearing on Insurance Solvency, supra note 3. at 11 (testimony of Terrence
Lennon, N.Y. Insurance Dep't).
171 Id.
172 Insurance Company Solvency, supra note 3. at 136 (testimony of Salvadore
Curiale, Superintendent, N.Y. State Ins. Dep't).
173 Id. at 118, 120 (testimony of Howard Metzenbaum, U.S. Senator from Ohio).
04 Donald Reese & Carol Reese, Reinsurance: The Basics and Bad Faith
Considerations, FICC Quarterly, Summer 1989 at 323. (quoting 13A Appleman. Insurance
Law AND Practice, § 7693, at 523 (1976).
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primary liability. The primary insurer remains liable for payment of
its claims and, if the reinsurer is unable to pay, the responsibility
falls on the primary insurer. 7 ' The financial advantage is that the
company which ceded the policies decreases its liabilities by
removing the business from its books; however, it has failed to
transfer the risk.
76
Another way that companies claim a positive net worth is through
the use of surplus notes.177 A surplus note is a "debt instrument
which carries a conditional obligation to repay a specified principal
amount.""7 Pursuant to statutory accounting practices, the surplus
note appears under the equity section on the insurer's balance
sheet. 79 The principal and interest owing on the note may only be
paid if the insurer's surplus after such payments will equal or exceed
a stated amount. 80 Currently, there is approximately $4.5 billion
in surplus notes outstanding in the insurance industry.'
These accounting practices which make the insurance companies
appear strong are reflected in the assessments by the major rating
firms. A.M. Best and Standard & Poors gave Executive Life,
Fidelity Bankers, and First Capital top ratings until a few months
before they were seized.' 2 In fact, Best's gave Mutual Benefit an
A+ rating until 16 days before it was seized.183 Thus, the invest-
ment practices of the insurance industry make it likely that the trend
of failures will continue. Given pension plans' increased involve-
ment with this industry, as well as the states' patchwork protection
for plans so involved, the PBGC's guaranties must be extended to
175 Id.
176 Insurance Company Solvency, supra note 3, at 136 (testimony of Salvadore
Curiale, Superintendent, N.Y. State Ins. Dep't).
07 Id at 118, 120 (testimony of Howard Metzenbaum, U.S. Senator from Ohio).
178 Robert Beisenherz & Rodney Moore, Straight Talk on Surplus Notes. BEST'S
REVIEw: Life/Health Insurance Div., 32, Nov. 1989.
179 Id at 111.
ISO Id at 32.
181 Insurance Company Solvency, supra note 3. at 118, 120 (testimony of Howard
Metzenbaum, U.S. Senator from Ohio).
182 In March 1990, Moody's lowered Executive Life's rating to BA (Questionable),
and in April 1991, to BI.
1 Jane Quinn, Is Your Insurance Company Really Safe?, NEWSWEEK, July 7. 1991.
at 38, 39. The rating company was aware of Mutual Benefit's portfolio of bad real estate
loans but chose to retain the solid rating while the company worked on its problems.
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insure all pension plan investments in the insurance industry, if
ERISA is to realize its goals.
IV. PBGC AS INSURER OF INSURANCE ANNUITIES
A. PBGC is Not Precluded From Insuring Pension
Obligations Held by Insurance Companies
ERISA does not explicitly state whether or not the PBGC
guaranty extends to commercial annuities distributed to a plan
participant in satisfaction of the plan's obligation for benefits.
However, the law and its surrounding history lend stronger support
to the position that annuity contracts are covered by the PBGC
guaranty than to the position, presently held by the PBGC, that they
are not.
The most fundamental support for the proposition that the PBGC
remains liable for pension benefits when the obligation is transferred
from the plan trust to an insurer is the mission of the PBGC as
provided in Section 1302(a) of ERISA:
(1) to encourage the continuation and maintenance of
voluntary private pension plansfor the benefit of their partici-
pants,
(2) to provide for the timely and uninterrupted payment
of pension benefits to participants and beneficiaiies under
plans to which this subchapter applies, and
(3) to maintain premiums established by the corporation
under section 1306 of this title at the lowest level consistent
with carrying out its obligations.' 8
Thus, considering that Congress' concern in establishing the PBGC
under ERISA was to protect pension plan participants by guarantying
certain benefit payments and ensuring their timely payment,"5 it is
illogical to argue that Congress intended for participants to lose this
18 29 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (emphasis added).
185 29 U.S.C. § 1302(a).
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protection merely because the obligation is transferred from the
pension trust to an insurance carrier.
Further support for the position that, under current law, the
PBGC remains liable after the plan obligation is transferred is found
in amendments to ERISA. Originally, Section 4041 of ERISA
provided that after filing notice of intent to terminate with PBGC and
upon receipt of a notice of sufficiency from PBGC, the plan
administrator could proceed to close out the plan.' However, to
provide guidance to plan administrators, PBGC issued regulations in
January, 1981 dealing with the determination of plan sufficiency and
the termination of sufficient plans. 8 7 The regulations provide that
"a participant with a benefit payable as an annuity under a terminat-
ing plan receive that benefit in annuity form," unless the participant
elects another form of distribution, such as a lump sum distribu-
tion.'u  PBGC stated that the purpose of this requirement is
compliance with their mission "to provide for the timely and
uninterrupted payment of pension benefits."8 9 The corporation
stated: "A pension is a retirement annuity. It would be inconsistent
with the Act for the PBGC to grant a plan administrator the
discretion to deprive a participant entitled to a retirement annuity of
that annuity.""
Moreover, when the PBGC published the proposed version of this
regulation in the Federal Register, some commentators questioned
whether the PBGC would provide benefits in situation where a plan
terminated under a notice of sufficiency and the insurance company
selected to provide annuity contracts subsequently became unable to
meet its obligations.' 9' In response to these concerns, the preamble
to the final regulations stated that the concern was unwarranted
because insurance companies were strictly regulated. 92 "However,
in the unlikely event that an insurance company should fail and its
186 29 U.S.C. § 1341.
187 PBGC Final Regulations on Determination of Plan Sufficiency and Termination




'I' 29 C.F.R. § 2615 (1981).
192 Id
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obligations cannot be satisfied (e.g. through a reinsurance system) the
PBGC would provide the necessary benefits."' 93
Furthermore, in 1986, Congress passed the Single-Employer
Pension Plan Amendments Act (SEPPAA) in order to streamline
termination procedures for sufficient plans.'" SEPPAA established
the "standard termination" procedure.' 95 In a standard termination,
the plan administrator may close out the plan, if he provides 60 days
advance notice of the intent to terminate to plan participants and
other affected parties. 196 As soon as practicable after the 60-day
notice is provided to participants, the plan administrator (a) sends to
the PBGC an actuarial certification that the plan has sufficient assets
to cover benefits liabilities and certain other information, 97 and (b)
notifies each participant and beneficiary of their share of benefit
liabilities;'98 and the PBGC does not issue a notice of non-
compliance with regard to the termination within 60 days.'" The
plan administrator must then purchase irrevocable commitments from
an insurer to provide the benefit liabilities or pay the participant a
lump sum. 200 Within 30 days after the final distribution is com-
pleted, the plan administrator must certify to PBGC that all liabilities
have been paid.20'
When these procedures for standard termination were being
considered, questions were raised about whether PBGC would
continue to guaranty benefits in a situation where, after plan assets
were distributed through the purchase of annuities from an insurer,
the insurer became insolvent. Congress added 29 U.S.C.
§ 1341(b)(4), the section on continuing authority, to address these
concerns. The section provides:
Nothing in this section shall be construed to preclude the
continued exercise by the corporation, after the termination
193 Id.
194 Comprehensive Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986. Title XI.
195 29 U.S.C. § 1341(b).
196 29 U.S.C. § 1341(b)(1)(A).
197 29 U.S.C. § 1341(b)(2)(A).
198 29 U.S.C. § 1341(b)(2)(B).
199 29 U.S.C. § 1341(b)(2)(C).
20 29 U.S.C. § 1341(b)(3)(A).
20 29 U.S.C. § 1341(b)(3)(B).
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date of a plan terminated in a standard termination under this
subsection, of its authority under section 1303 with respect to
matters relating to the termination. A certification under
paragraph (3)(B) shall not affect the corporation's obligations
under section 1322 of this title. °2
The legislative history pertaining to this provision reveals that:
Even if the plan administrator has certified to the PBGC that
the assets of the plan have been distributed so as to provide
when due all benefit entitlements and all other benefits to
which assets are allocated under Section 4044, the PBGC is
still obligated to guarantee the payment of benefits under
Section 4022 if it is subsequently determined that not all
guaranteed benefits were in fact distributed under a standard
termination, and the contributing sponsors of the plan and the
members of their controlled groups do not promptly provide
for the payment of such benefits.
203
Furthermore, during consideration of SEPPAA, the PBGC
proposed an amendment which would have expressly exempted
benefits provided under annuity contracts from the termination
insurance program. Section 112(a) of Bill H.R. 2995, introduced on
July 15, 1985, would have amended Section 4005(b)(2) of ERISA to
provide that "no amount in such fund shall be available to pay
benefits in the event of the insolvency of an insurance company with
respect to an insurance contract." This section of the bill was
rejected by Congress.
Finally, the shift in the nature of insurance companies must be
considered. PBGC provides for the purchase of insurance annuities
to satisfy plan liabilities because insurance companies have tradition-
ally been stable, long term, low risk investors and, thus, their
products were sound investments. However, since the insurance
industry is now suffering from a poor investment portfolio, the
assumption in the law that insurance annuities are a secure invest-
2D2 29 U.S.C § 1341(b)(4).
203 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 706 (emphasis added).
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ment with which to provide pension obligations is unwarranted.
Thus, the thrust of the law, protecting the retirement money of the
pensioners, dictates that the PBGC must continue to insure pension
funds when they are transferred to an insurer.
Clearly, there is strong support within the law and its history for
the position that the PBGC remains liable when the pension
obligation is transferred from the plan to an insurer. PBGC's
mission to guaranty promised benefits to pensioners has been
reaffirmed by the Corporation itself when ERISA was amended in
1981 and 1986 and, in 1985, Congress rejected PBGC's attempt to
extinguish this liability.
Nonetheless, PBGC presently claims that its guaranty does not
apply to commercial annuities distributed pursuant to a plan
termination because the participant has received his total benefits
under the plan.20" On January 14, 1991, The general counsel for
PBGC stated the corporation's position on its liability for insurance
annuities: "[T]he statute does not authorize PBGC to guarantee
benefits distributed in the form of irrevocable annuity contracts from
insurance companies." ' 5 PBGC reasons that when a covered plan
terminates with insufficient funds to pay its benefit obligations,
PBGC becomes trustee of the plan and pays the guaranteed bene-
fits.2°6 However, when a plan terminates with sufficient assets,
ERISA simply oversees the allocation of plan assets and the
distribution of benefits.0 7 This position is contrary to that ex-
pressed in the corporation's preamble to final regulations on
termination procedures for sufficient plans (e.g., "[i]n the unlikely
event that an insurance company should fail and its obligations
cannot be satisfied, ... the PBGC would provide the necessary
benefits"20 8).
2W Guarantees of Retirement Annuities, supra note 29. at 24 (statement of Sen. Lloyd
Bentsen).
25 Pension Annuity Protection, Pt.l, supra note 2. at 163. (Letter of Carol Flowe.
General Counsel, PBGC to D. Snyder, Assistant Director. Pension Equity Issues, Human
Resources Division, U.S. Accounting Office.)
IM ld. (referring to ERISA §§ 4022. 4041(c). 4042. 4044. 4061).
M7 Id. (referring to ERISA. §§ 4041(b). 4044).
Id., Pt. II, at 68 (testimony of Norman Stein, Esq.. Prof. of Law. University of
Alabama) (quoting 46 Fed. Reg. 9532, at 9534).
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PBGC now argues that since the insurable event is the termina-
tion, that where there exist sufficient funds upon termination,
PBGC's obligation is met when annuity contracts are distributed to
participants.2" 9 This position relies on a somewhat strained reading
of section 4022 of ERISA.210 Section 4022 provides that PBGC
must guarantee "the payment of all nonforfeitable benefits... under
a single-employer plan which terminates at a time when this title
applies to it. '21' Norman Stein, formerly an attorney specializing
in tax and pension law, currently teaching pension law at University
of Alabama School of Law, argues that "there is no reason to believe
that Congress intended for the guarantee to expire the moment of
plan termination simply because the plan has made nominal provision
for the future payment of benefits., 21 2 "The purchase of an annuity
contract from a company without the ability to pay the plan's
liabilities is simply not the payment of all plan benefits ... "'
PBGC's current position on its liability has not yet been tested in
court.
214
B. Remodeling PBGC After SIPC
Having established that PBGC's mission is to ensure the "timely
and uninterrupted payment of pension benefits," that PBGC is not
legally precluded from insuring the benefits of previous defined
pension plan participants who rely on insurance products, and that
the current condition of the insurance industry poses a real threat to
all plan participants 215 who rely on insurance products, this article
M Guarantees of Retirement Annuities, supra note 29, at 25 (statement of Sen. Lloyd
Bentsen).
210 Id at 68.
211 ERISA, § 4022.
212 Id., Pt. I1, at 70 (testimony of Norman Stein, Esq. Prof. of Law, University of
Alabama).
213 Id.
214 Id., Pt. I, at 77 (testimony of Joseph Delfico. Dir.. Income Security Issues, Human
Resources Div.).
215 PBGC's guaranty should extend to insurance products purchased not only from
ongoing defined benefit plans, defined benefit plans that terminate, and those which are
reverted, but also from defined contribution plans. Defined contribution plans have gained
popularity since the law was written and the retirement income of pensioners participating
in these plans is also at risk from insolvent insurance companies. See supra Section 11 C.
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now focuses on remodeling PBGC after SIPC in order to protect
American retirees in this time of insurance company vulnerability.
The Securities Investor Protection Corp. (SIPC) was created
when Congress passed the Securities Investor Protection Act in
1970.2" All persons registered as brokers or dealers under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or who are members of a national
securities exchange generally belong to SIPC.217 The corporation
protects customer funds and securities such as notes, stocks, bonds,
debentures, and certificates of deposit from dealer failure." 8 SIPC
consults with and cooperates with the SEC and the self regulatory
organizations (SRO's) within the industry; each dealer belongs to one
of these organizations." 9 The self regulating organizations notify
SIPC upon discovering that a member broker-dealer is in, or is
approaching, financial difficulty. SIPC then reviews the facts with
the examining SRO.22 ° The corporation determines whether the
member has failed, or is in danger of failing, to meet its obligations
to customers.221 If the broker-dealer is unable to make the neces-
sary corrections, SIPC will intervene to protect the customers.222
The customer accounts may be transferred to another SIPC broker-
dealer, or, if transfer is not possible, a SIPC appointed trustee will
take over the member assets and fulfill the SIPC protection to
customers.223 The maximum protection provided is $500,000 of
224customer assets. ' 4 SIPC is financed by assessing members three-
sixteenths of one percent per year of business. 225 Additionally, the
law provides that SIPC could borrow up to $1 billion dollars from
the U.S. Treasury if its funds prove to be insufficient.
226
Using SIPC as a model, the two major problems with extending
PBGC coverage can be overcome. PBGC is concerned with
216 William Ruckstuhl, Protecting Investors' Funds, Through the SIPC, BEST'S
REVIEW: Life/Health Ins. Div., 78, Feb. 1991.
217 Id.







225 Id. at 80.
226 Id.
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providing guaranties to an industry that it does not regulate227 and
with adequately funding such extended coverage.22 8 First, in order
to avoid the "moral hazard" that could arise from the PBGC insuring
an industry that it does not regulate, insurers interested in selling
insurance products to pension plans should be required to register
with the PBGC in order to qualify for pension product insurance. To
encourage pension plans to deal with these federally registered
insurance companies, favorable tax treatment under ERISA and the
IRC would be available only to plans that purchased products from
registered companies. In order to allow for uniform regulation of the
registered insurance companies and for uniform federal insolvency
proceedings, the McCarran-Ferguson Act would have to be modified
to permit federal regulation in addition to the state regulation. Then,
the PBGC could work in conjunction with NAIC to monitor and
regulate the insurance companies much like SIPC works with the
SROs. Working together with NAIC, the PBGC can readily discover
when an insurer is approaching financial difficulty.
The second concern of the PBGC in extending pension plan
guaranties is adequately funding the extended coverage. First, this
concern may be abated by early intervention. Since the PBGC and
the NAIC will be closely monitoring the insurance companies that
provide pension products, PBGC will be able to intervene at the first
signs of financial distress and place the pension plan assets with
other registered insurers. This would parallel SIPC's power to
transfer customer accounts to another broker-dealer. Since the
insurers currently pay policy obligations when an insurer in the state
is seized by contributing a -pro rata portion to the state guaranty
funds, this will not be an additional burden on the companies.
Secondly, instead of obtaining funding from the pension plans, PBGC
could assess the insurance companies based on a percentage of the
pension products they sell each year in order to provide for its larger
liability. Such a premium structure would not burden plan sponsors
M Certain Issues Relating to the Conservatorship, supra note 3, at 65 (testimony of
James Lockhart, Exec. Dir., PBGC).
228 Id. at 66. At the end of 1991, PBGC's deficit for single-employer plans was $2.5
billion. "The program has assets of $5.7 billion and liabilities of $8.2 billion." THE MIAMI
HERALD, Feb. 19. 1992, at 3C.
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and create a disincentive to provide pension plans. These proposals
address the concern of adequate funding.
Aside from providing consistent guaranties to all pension plans
investing in insurance products by allowing for uniform regulation
and liquidation proceedings, this federal regulatory scheme will
eliminate pensioner's wait while the state funds raise the money
following a liquidation.
V. CONCLUSION
The federal government passed ERISA and established the PBGC
in order to protect the pension funds of American retirees. However,
the protections offered by the current system are inadequate to insure
pensioners' earned benefits because plan investments in insurance
products, such as annuities and GICs, remove pensioners' benefits
from federal coverage. Pensioners thus depend on state insurance
guaranty funds to insure their earned benefits; this protection is
insufficient in light of the trend of insurance insolvency in the nation.
In order for ERISA to fulfill its mission of assuring the timely and
uninterrupted payment of pension benefits, the federal government
should insure pension plan investments in insurance products. This
can be accomplished by restructuring the PBGC to work like SIPC;
such a restructuring will allow PBGC to regulate insurance compa-
nies that provide investment vehicles to pension plans and will allow
PBGC to increase its premiums to cover the increased liability.
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